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Abstract: After coining the term “philopsychy” to describe a “soul-loving” approach to
philosophical practice, especially when it welcomes a creative synthesis of philosophy and
psychology, this article identifies a system of geometrical figures (or “maps”) that can be used to
stimulate reflection on various types of perspectival differences. The maps are part of the
author’s previously established mapping methodology, known as the Geometry of Logic. As an
illustration of how philosophy can influence the development of psychology, Immanuel Kant’s
table of twelve categories and Carl Jung’s theory of psychological types are shown to share a
common logical structure. Just as Kant proposes four basic categories, each expressed in terms of
three subordinate categories, Jung proposes four basic personality functions, each having three
possible manifestations. The concluding section presents four scenarios illustrating how such
maps can be used in philosophical counseling sessions to stimulate philopsychic insight.
1. Philopsychy and Map-Making as Tools for Shaping Perspectives
Contemporary philosophy and psychology share a common heritage. Both stem from the
older discipline of classical (pre-Kantian) philosophy. Whereas classical philosophy included
psychology and was motivated by a life-long search for self-knowledge (as epitomized by the
maxim, ‘Know thyself’), nowadays philosophy and psychology are generally regarded as distinct
disciplines, often having very limited aims, such as the objective study of language and behavior,
respectively. Such attempts to render philosophy and psychology scientific are laudable and
worthy of pursuit, as long as practitioners do not regard their approach as excluding a more
subjective approach that focuses on practical applications—an exclusion all too often
recommended by prominent members of both disciplines. The past two centuries have witnessed
an important, and I believe inevitable, rupturing of philosophy, with the fragments producing
numerous new sciences, such as analytic philosophy and behavioural psychology. Fruitful as
these approaches may be, we must not allow them to eclipse the classical understanding of
2philosophy and psychology as modes of self-knowledge.
I am not suggesting here that we go backward in time to a ‘golden age’, but that we press
on to a new level of understanding by recognizing how philosophy and psychology, as distinct
disciplines, can work together to help us understand who we are. With this renewed call to
scholarly self-understanding in mind, I have coined the term ‘philopsychy’ to denote a specific
approach to philosophical practice (or to scholarship of any type, but especially when it is applied
to philosophical and/or psychological topics). The word ‘philopsychy’ is a hybrid, composed of
the first syllable of the words ‘philosophy’ and ‘psychology’. These two syllables come from the
Greek words meaning ‘love’ (or friendship) and ‘soul’. Philopsychy, therefore, is essentially a
soul-loving approach to any scholarly issue.
I take ‘soul-loving’ to imply a variety of guidelines for how we carry out our scholarly
work. For instance, persons should be more important than principles. Likewise, theories and
other truth claims should not be torn apart and left in a state of shambles, merely to demonstrate
one’s logical rigour; instead, recognizing the tentative, subjective nature of all meaningful truth,
philopsychers will reject a proposed truth-claim only as and when they have a better ones to put
in its place. The most fundamental philopsychic maxim is that scholarship should be done in the
service of the twin virtues of self-knowledge and shared insight. The virtue of self-knowledge
comes from the classical ‘Know thyself’ maxim. The virtue of shared insight includes the
realization not only that our own insight is to be deeply rooted in the insights of our tradition (a
point often neglected by analytic philosophers), but also that the experience of having an insight
carries with it the responsibility of sharing that insight with others.
In this essay I shall illustrate how philopsychy works by examining two well-known
theories, as proposed by one early modern philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and one
early modern psychologist, Carl Jung (1775-1961)—two scholars whose work was in many ways
3philopsychic. Before doing this, however, I would like to make one further point about how I
believe philopsychy is best carried out. In order for our soul-loving to be authentic, we must
recognize that the soul has and gives a structure. This structure gives rise on the one hand to the
discipline we call ‘logic’, and on the other hand to an amazing ability human beings have to see
one and the same experience in a variety of distinct (and equally valid) ways. I use the word
‘perspective’ as a technical term to describe a logically distinct way of interpreting a given
experience. The goal of sharing philopsychic insights in any discipline, therefore, will always be
related in some way to the clarification of perspectives.
In The Road Less Traveled, M. Scott Peck (1978, pp.49,45) describes psychotherapy as ‘a
process of map-revising’, explaining that ‘the biggest problem of map-making is ... that if our
maps are to be accurate we have to continually revise them.’ This dual insight applies not only to
good psychotherapy, but also to any attempt to do philosophy or psychology that is to be
philopsychic, whether it be in a counselor’s office or in a classroom. Indeed, as a university
teacher attempting to guide students through difficult philosophical or psychological theories, or
when discussing more personal issues with them outside of class, I frequently use diagrams to
clarify the conceptual relations under consideration. I call these diagrams ‘maps’. A map, as I
shall employ the term, is a geometrical representation of a ‘model’ (i.e., of an abstract set of
interrelated concepts) in which the logical relations between the concepts have a one-to-one
correspondence with the structural relations between the different parts of the diagram. The
process of coming to know and deciding to revise a conceptual model that guides our
understanding of life can be greatly facilitated by actually drawing the model as a visible map.
What I hope to demonstrate below is that this need not be a merely haphazard process that takes
us by surprise in a series of psychotherapy sessions; rather, it is a skill that can be learned by
studying the basic forms of logic and how they relate to changes in perspectives.
4In a number of previous publications—most notably, Chapter 3 of Kant’s System of
Perspectives (Palmquist, 1993) and Chapter 5 of The Tree of Philosophy (Palmquist 2000a)—I
have developed a systematic theory of perspectival mapping, called the ‘Geometry of Logic’.
Although the original book-length manuscript that lays out the basic principles of this new
mapping-technique in great detail (see Palmquist, 1986) remains in draft form to this day, I have
applied this tool in numerous articles as an aide to interpreting Kant’s philosophy and throughout
my books on Kant (Palmquist, 1993 and 2000b), as well as in several articles where it is applied
in a variety of other ways (e.g., Palmquist, 1992 and 2006).
The most basic distinction shaping this theory is between ‘analytic’ (twofold) and
‘synthetic’ (threefold) ways of forming conceptual relations. A simple analytic relation exists
between any pair of opposites, while a simple synthetic relation consists of two opposites plus a
third term that combines (or ‘synthesizes’) the opposites. The most obvious geometrical maps
that can be used to represent these simple forms of relation are the line segment (with its two
opposite endpoints) and the triangle (with its three vertices), respectively. Figure 1 uses the ‘+’
and ‘-’ symbols to denote conceptual opposition, while Figure 2 adds a third term, ‘x’, to denote
the synthesis of opposites.
+-
Figure 1: The Line Segment as a 1LAR Map
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Figure 2: The Triangle as a 1LSR Map
In both cases these simple forms of relation also give rise to more complex ‘levels’. The
formula determining the structure of all analytic relations is:
2L = N
where ‘L’ stands for the ‘level’ of the distinction (i.e., how many pairs of opposites are being in-
terrelated) and ‘N’ stands for the ‘number’ of different combinations. For instance, the most
common type of analytic relation, the ‘second-level analytic relation’ (or ‘2LAR’), consists of
two pairs of opposites that combine to produce four interrelated concepts (2 x 2 = 4). As such, it
is best mapped onto the four endpoints of a cross (i.e., two line segments intersecting at their
midpoints, with each segment representing the distinction between one pair of opposites), as
shown below:
++
---+
+-
Figure3:TheCrossasa2LARMap
6The formula determining the structure of all synthetic relations is similar to the one for
analytic relations, the only difference being that the ‘2’ is replaced by a ‘3’:
3L = N
Thus the ‘second-level synthetic relation’ (‘2LSR’) has nine combinations (3 x 3 = 9) and would
need to be mapped onto a geometrical figure with nine distinct points, such as the Enneagram
(see Beesing, et al., 1984, and Palmquist, 1997, pp.177-185).
Analytic and synthetic maps can also be combined to form what I call ‘compound
relations’. For our purposes the most significant compound relation is the ‘12CR’, or ‘twelvefold
compound relation’. This consists of a 2LAR with each of its four components divided into a
1LSR (4 x 3 = 12). Examples of this form of conceptual relation abound in our daily life: the
twelve hours on our clock dials, the twelve months on our calendars and the twelve houses of the
zodiac are a few of the most obvious and familiar examples. What is important to note here is
that, in order to be a true 12CR, these relations must be regarded not merely as a haphazard
collection of any twelve items, but as an integrated whole made up of four sets of three, where
the four is a 2LAR and each set of three is a 1LSR. Other, less known examples could also be
cited, such as Maxwell’s twelve equations defining the nature of electro-magnetism or the twelve
types of sub-atomic particle postulated by the Standard Model in contemporary physics (see
Palmquist, 2006). But rather than dwelling on such examples here, let me draw attention to the
map shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: The Crossed Circle as a 12CR Map
A circle divided into four quadrants by a cross, with each quadrant having two additional points
equidistant between the two poles of the cross (like a clock dial), is the most obvious geometrical
representation of the logical form of a 12CR.
The two examples of philopsychic insight I have chosen to discuss below (one from Kant
and one from Jung) can both be understood in terms of this basic 12CR map. But before turning
our attention to Kant, one final point must be stressed: the primary purpose of making such
conceptual maps is to clarify the logical relations between different perspectives. This, indeed, is
where the Geometry of Logic has its most significant practical application. For when attempting
to organize a given set of concepts in a way that enables us to map it onto a geometrical figure,
we often discover new perspectives on the topic at hand—e.g., new options that we had not
previously considered, or new ways of holding together multiple options in tension with each
other. Particularly when it comes to employing maps as tools for philosophical counseling, the
notion of perspectives will prove to be of utmost importance.
With these preliminary points in mind, I shall examine in the next two sections two very
different, but highly influential models with a high potential to be employed as philopsychic
maps: Immanuel Kant’s grouping of the 12 logical functions of thought into four ‘categories’,
8and Carl Jung’s grouping of psychological types into four ‘functions’. Both theories are well
known and much-discussed, so for our purposes a brief summary of their main points (paying
close attention to the logical parallels between them) will suffice. I shall then conclude by
providing four illustrations of how such maps might be used to assist counselees in identifying
new perspectives on life-situations, thereby solving practical problems in a ‘philopsychic’ way.
2. Kant’s 12 Categories as a Philosophical Map
A fact about Kant’s philosophy that is almost always either neglected as irrelevant or else
explicitly rejected as an unfortunate impediment to understanding his true insights is that his
philosophical System is permeated through and through with a deep sense of systematic
interrelation between its different parts. Kant himself refers to this map-like aspect of his way of
doing philosophy as an ‘architectonic plan’ (e.g., 1965, p.27). In so doing he is employing one of
his favorite metaphors, between a philosopher’s attempt to construct a coherent system out of the
raw materials of various concepts and intuitions and an architect’s attempt to design a sturdy
building out of raw materials such as bricks and mortar.
But for Kant, reason’s architectonic structure is more than just a random analogy: he
believes it is rooted in our very nature. Thus, in the course of explaining the ‘interest’ reason has
in finding a solution to the irresolvable conflicts Kant calls ‘antinomies’, he asserts that ‘[h]uman
reason is by nature architectonic’ (Kant, 1965, p.502). The architectonic, he explains, is reason’s
tendency to regard ‘all our knowledge as belonging to a possible system’—i.e., to a logically
coherent set of interrelated concepts. Just as good architects make a blueprint of their plans
before attempting to construct a given building, so also good philosophers should make a map of
reason’s structure before attempting to answer the deepest questions of metaphysics (especially
those relating to God, freedom and immortality).
9Kant’s hope was that the perceptive reader, assuming the System’s architectonic unity,
would be able to apprehend ‘the idea of the whole’ and thereby ‘easily resolve’ the ‘apparent
contradictions’ that arise when ‘single passages’ are ‘torn from their contexts’ (1965, pp.860-79).
Unfortunately, although he clearly explains what ‘architectonic’ is–namely, ‘the art of
constructing systems’ (p.860)–Kant himself never clearly explained the structure he used to
organize his philosophical System. History has thus proved his hope to be overly optimistic.
Instead of taking Kant’s hint and attempting to clarify the structure of reason’s architectonic,
interpreters have tended to regard Kant’s emphasis on the latter as the source of his most
lamentable errors. Wolff (1963), for example, assumes throughout his book that exposing the
complications and apparent inconsistencies arising out of Kant’s adherence to his architectonic
plan will ‘carry us closer to the truth [than the architectonic itself], not farther from it’ (p.204; see
also p.191n), for such ‘architectonic considerations ... obscure and misrepresent Kant’s real
teaching’ (p.206): ‘The first aim of a commentary ... should be to show how this is so, and why it
has happened.’ By contrast, I have attempted in a series of previous publications to counteract
this tendency by drawing hints from Kant’s various incidental comments about the structure of
his System (see Palmquist, 1986, 1993, ch.3, and 2000, ch.5). In a nutshell my claim is that the
architectonic unity of reason is itself a twelvefold structure—a 12CR, to be exact—and that
Kant’s Table of Categories exhibits the basic form of this structure. We could discuss this
structure by examining the four basic ‘perspectives’ in Kant’s System (each corresponding to one
of the four ‘faculties’ of the mind): the transcendental, the logical, the empirical and the
hypothetical perspectives are rooted in the faculties of sensibility, understanding, judgment and
reason, respectively. But instead, let us look at the theory of categories itself.
Kant’s table of 12 categories has often been prematurely rejected by those who neglect
Kant’s warning, near the beginning of the first chapter of the Analytic of Concepts, to the effect
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that his goal in introducing the table at that stage is not to prove the validity of each category, but
merely to present the form for any complete system of categories; as such, he explicitly contrasts
his own a priori approach with Aristotle’s empirical approach (Kant, 1965, 105-109). (Kant
supports his choices with rigourous arguments only later, in the chapter on the Principles of Pure
Understanding.) He describes this form quite clearly as one consisting of two sets of oppositions,
combined together to form four main ‘heads’, each having three ‘moments’ that represent a
development from two opposites to a third, synthetic moment. In other words, the categories
form a perfect 12CR.
In preparation for showing how this 12CR can be used for clarification of the kind of
personal problems that tend to arise in counseling situations, let’s take a closer look at the
structure of Kant’s table. The basic 2LAR is between the categories of ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ on
the one hand and the categories of ‘relation’ and modality’ on the other. All possible items of
empirical knowledge—i.e., any human experience that can give rise to scientific knowledge—
must have a conceptual form that includes items falling into each of these four categories. As
shown in Figure 5, the first pair gives rise to the ‘mathematical’ principles (i.e., the ‘axioms of
intuition’ and the ‘anticipations of perception’), while the second gives rise to the ‘dynamical’
principles (i.e., the ‘analogies of experience’ and the ‘postulates of empirical thought’). After
drawing this distinction at the beginning of the chapter on the Principles of Pure Understanding
(Kant, 1965, pp.199-200; see also p.110), Kant uses the four phrases quoted in parentheses in the
previous sentence as headings of the chapter’s four main sections.
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Figure 5: Kant’s Principles Mapped onto a 2LAR Cross
Each category (as well as its derivative principle) can itself be broken down into three
subordinate categories (principles), as shown in Figure 6:
necessity
totalityreciprocity
limitation
causality reality
pluralitypossibility
actuality unity
negationsubstance
Quantity
QualityRelation
Modality
Figure 6: Kant’s Table of Categories as a 12CR
As we shall see in §4, an easy way of referring to each subordinate category in a counseling
session is to focus on the type of judgment it generates, as shown in Figure 7 (which uses a
slightly more sophisticated map, combining the cross and circle with triangles and a square to
form a map with all the basic components of a Jungian mandala):
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Figure 7: Kant’s Forms of Judgment as a 12CR
In his discussion of ‘the logical function of the understanding in judgments’ (Kant, 1965,
95-101), Kant lists under quantity the opposites ‘universal’ and ‘particular’, claiming they are
synthesized by ‘singular’ judgments. Under quality, the opposites ‘affirmative’ and ‘negative’ are
synthesized by ‘infinite’ judgments. Likewise, the three judgments of relation are ‘categorical’,
‘hypothetical’ and ‘disjunctive’, while those of modality are ‘problematic’, ‘assertoric’ and
‘apodeictic’. Each triad is meant to imitate the logical form of a simple syllogism, with the two
opposites being like the premises of an argument and the third term being like the conclusion.
The Table of Categories follows the same form, doing for concepts what the earlier table did for
judgments (namely, laying bare the formal structure imposed by the human understanding on all
our knowledge). And the Principles, too, are meant to follow this twelvefold form, though Kant
does not fully elaborate all 12 components in that application.
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(A tangential point of significant interest is that the overall exposition of Kant’s argument
in several of his key systematic works can be interpreted as fitting into the same twelvefold form
as his Table of Categories. This is true not only in the first and second Critiques, written in 1781
and 1788, but perhaps most obviously in his 1793 book, Religion within the Bounds of Bare
Reason. I have demonstrated this aspect of the formal structure of Kant’s arguments in Chapters
VII and VIII of Kant’s System of Perspectives (1993) and in Chapters VII and VIII of Kant’s
Critical Religion (2000).)
Kant’s theory of categories has been criticized from a variety of angles ever since he first
proposed it in 1781. The most frequent criticism nowadays is that, although Kant was correct to
argue that some categorial scheme is necessary for human knowledge, he was wrong to assume
there could be only one. Such critics argue that a variety of categorial schemes is possible—
though I have yet to find a critic who actually goes so far as to suggest a detailed alternative to
Kant’s. My point in this section has not been to defend the legitimacy or even the coherence of
Kant’s specific choices in constructing his Table of Judgments. I have done that in numerous
previous publications. Instead, it is enough merely to introduce the map, with a special emphasis
on its logical-systematic structure, so that I can include it in my subsequent reflections on how
such philosophical and psychological maps can be used as counseling tools. Concerning this
structure, it is important to keep in mind that the whole theory is based on three levels of logical
distinctions, interwoven in a single model: on the first level, mathematical categories are
‘intuitive’ (-) while the dynamical categories are ‘discursive’ (+); on the second level, ‘quantity’
(-) and ‘quality’ (+) are opposite types of intuitive categories, while ‘relation’ (-) and ‘modality’
(+) are opposite discursive types; and on the third level, each of the four categories is broken
down into a triad consisting of a pair of opposites and a third, synthetic term. This logical form,
as we shall see, provides us with a model of the mechanism of human cognition that can be
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helpful in understanding numerous life-situations that might be discussed in counseling sessions.
3. Jung’s 12 Types as a Psychological Map
At first sight, Jung’s Analytical Psychology may seem to bear little resemblance to Kant’s
Critical Philosophy. The latter is a priori, whereas the former takes an explicitly empirical, a
posteriori approach. Kant is interested in solving the deepest and most abstract problems of
metaphysics; Jung prefers to focus on the concrete, personal problems brought by his patients to
psychotherapy sessions. Yet a closer look reveals a surprisingly high degree of complementarity
between these two scholars. Both, I would argue, exemplified a way of practicing their respective
disciplines that can be called ‘philopsychic’. This similarity is no accident, for Jung himself
acknowledges on numerous occasions the extent of his debt to Kant. In his autobiography, for
example, Jung speaks of reading Kant as a youth and finding great insight in his writings. At one
point (Jung, 1983, p.122), he goes so far as to express his frustration at being too busy as a
medical student by saying ‘I was able to study Kant only on Sundays.’ Particularly influential
was Jung’s reading of Kant’s 1766 book, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of
Metaphysics, which he says ‘came just at the right moment’ (Jung, 1983, p.120).
That many of Jung’s theories bear the mark of this Kantian influence can hardly be
doubted. For Jung himself attests repeatedly (though never in any great or systematic detail) to
the Kantian nature of his psychological theory. Thus, for instance, after mentioning Kant’s use of
the categories at one point (Jung, 1984, p.132), Jung says the categories are ‘intellectual
applications of the archetypes.’ The archetypes, of course, are the theoretical constructs Jung uses
to describe how the human unconscious fulfills its compensatory function in relation to the
conscious mind. Unfortunately, Jung does not provide any details concerning his understanding
of the relationship between the archetypes and the categories. One obvious difference is that, in
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contrast to Kant’s highly logical map of the categories, Jung shies away from providing a
systematic description of the archetypes. He makes it clear that the shadow and the anima (or
animus) are the two main archetypal personalities, and that several others (such as the wise old
man, the great mother and the trickster) are of secondary importance; but he also claims to have
discovered numerous others. How Kant’s categories can be regarded as ‘applications’ of these
archetypes is far from evident.
Fortunately, Jung does develop one aspect of his psychology into a systematic theory with
a clear logical structure: perhaps for this reason, Jung’s theory of psychological types is probably
the most widely accepted of all his theories. Jung relates his theory of types to the archetypes in
some interesting ways, suggesting that the archetypes might have the potential to be more
logically ordered. On this basis, as I have argued elsewhere (Palmquist, 1997, p.168), the four
most important components in Jung’s theory of archetypes (namely, persona, ego, shadow and
anima/animus) seem to have a direct correspondence to the four basic components in his theory
of types (namely, thinking, sensation, feeling and intuition). But elaborating on this correlation,
and its possible implications for the connection between Jung and Kant, is beyond the scope of
the present essay.
In his book, Psychological Types, Jung constructs a logically well-formed model of the
differences between four basic types of personality ‘function’: thinking, feeling, sensation and
intuition. Just as every item of empirical knowledge is, according to Kant, characterized by some
manifestation of all four categories of understanding, so also Jung argues that every human being
manifests each of these four personality types—though with different degrees of consciousness.
Like Kant, Jung describes this fourfold distinction in terms of a perfect 2LAR, which can be
mapped onto the cross, as shown in Figure 8:
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Figure 8: Jung’s Functions Mapped onto a 2LAR Cross
Here we see that thinking and feeling are grouped together as ‘judging’ functions and regarded as
the opposite of the ‘perceiving’ functions, sensation and intuition. Moreover, just as in Kant’s
case (cf. Figure 5), the pair of functions on either side of this basic opposition is itself an
opposition: sensation and intuition oppose each other in a way directly parallel to quantity and
quality; thinking and feeling likewise correspond directly to relation and modality.
The parallel between Kant’s map of the understanding’s categories and Jung’s map of the
psyche’s types goes still further. For just as Kant regards each category as manifesting itself in
two opposite forms that can be combined or synthesized into a third form, so also Jung regards
each function as having either an ‘extraverted’ or an ‘introverted’ manifestation, with the ideal
goal being to learn how to balance these two throughout the course of one’s life. Although Jung
himself only hints at this possibility, some Jungians have argued that introversion and
extraversion can appear as ‘mixed’ (i.e., synthesized) in some persons. Thanks to the
development and popularization of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Test, the conventional way
of systematizing Jung’s theory has been to regard it as a series of four dyadic levels, beginning
with the extravert-introvert opposition, proceeding through the functional oppositions between
sensation-intuition and thinking-feeling, and ending with the more general opposition between
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judging and perceiving. According to this way of mapping, Jung’s system must be regarded as a
4LAR, with 16 possible combinations (2 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 16). I have no objection to this
conventional interpretation of Jung’s distinctions; my point here is simply that an equally
plausible interpretation is to regard them as giving rise to a form (see Figure 9) that corresponds
directly to Kant’s Table of Categories.
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(---)
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Figure 9: Jung’s System of Psychological Types as a 12CR
If my suggestion is correct, then we should be able to find a number of interesting
correlations between both the structure and the applications of Kant’s categories and Jung’s
types. I have already mentioned one significant example. In both systems the basic 2LAR denotes
a set of concepts that all apply in each possible case, whereas only one of the three subordinate
concepts will apply at any given time. In Kant’s theory this means a judgment cannot be fully
categorical and fully hypothetical at the same time, though if it is disjunctive, then it can be
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regarded as combining key features of both. Likewise, in Jung’s theory, a person’s attitude at any
given point of time cannot be both introverted and extraverted, yet if one’s personality is
balanced, then it will combine prominent features of both attitudes.
Rather than citing additional similarities, I shall conclude this section with a brief note on
a rather different topic: despite the obviously a priori (logical) structure of Jung’s system of
types, he claims his theory is based on empirical evidence (see e.g., Jung, 1964, pp.45-56). This
may be true, but only in the same way that Kant acknowledges Aristotle’s theory of categories as
an important empirical precursor to his own a priori theory of categories. For in its most mature
formulation, Jung’s theory undoubtedly exhibits an architectonic structure (whether it be a 12CR
or a 4LAR) that gives it an undeniably a priori form.
4. Philopsychic Maps as Stimuli for Insight: Four Counseling Scenarios
As a university professor and teacher of philosophy and religion (including one class that
focuses on Jungian psychology) for nearly two decades, I have had numerous opportunities to
speak with students outside of class about a wide variety of personal issues. Students respond
well, I have found, to a caring teacher whose commitment to a philopsychic way of life becomes
obvious in class. Hong Kong students tend to have a rather difficult time communicating with
their parents—especially fathers are generally remote and too busy or too authoritarian to
approach for counsel. As a result, I have found myself, almost accidentally, in numerous
conversations that could be described as ‘counseling’ situations.
Seeing myself not as a psychologist, or even as a counselor in any traditional sense, I have
had to formulate a rather different self-understanding of what I am doing when I engage in such
conversations. My knowledge and appreciation of Jungian psychology make me keenly aware of
the psychological aspects of what I am doing. Being primarily a Kantian philosopher, however, I
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prefer to think of these conversations as opportunities to practice doing philosophy. In the early
1990s I developed the concept of ‘philopsychy’ as a single term that combines the soulful focus
of psychology with the wisdom-loving of philosophy (see §1). I’ll therefore conclude with some
illustrations of how the logic maps introduced above can be used to bring philopsychic insight
into such situations. I’ll draw the main features of my examples from actual counseling
experiences, but will change key details to protect the identity of the persons concerned—and
also, at times, to enhance the applicability of the illustrations.
Although each of the following illustrations is based on one or more real situation(s), I
shall refer to them as ‘scenarios’ in order to indicate that they are more like imaginative accounts
of how such maps could be used than historical accounts (‘case studies’) of how I have actually
used them. This section, then, should be regarded more as a manifesto outlining my intent to use
such methods in the ways described, than as a record of my past success in using them. The real
situations from which I have adapted these scenarios involved the emergence of insights similar
(if not identical) to the ones described below, though in some cases the problems were not
resolved in exactly the way I have indicated. Having learned something from my mistakes, these
quasi-imaginary accounts describe how I would have used the maps, had my understanding of
their potential been sufficiently well developed at the time.
The application of Jung’s theory of psychological types to counseling situations is
somewhat obvious and has been examined by numerous writers and employed by counselors the
world over. It is used, in the first place, to help the counselor understand differences between
types of ‘normality’ that might at first seem highly abnormal, due to a difference in psychological
types between the counselor and the counselee. This helps counselors to be more accepting of
those who come to them for help. But it also equips counselees with a map enabling them to see
problem relationships from alternative perspectives. Such applications of Jungian typology are so
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well known that I shall cite only one scenario. This will enable me to spend more time exploring
the less obvious applications of Kant’s categorial map in three subsequent scenarios.
Scenario I. Sally sat at my feet, gazing up at me as if I were God. (I have a carpet and
some loose cushions in my office, so some students prefer to sit on the floor rather than on
chairs.) She had been a student in my psychology class the previous semester, and liked to drop
in every so often to chat about a wide variety of topics. On this occasion we had been discussing
Nietzsche’s theory of eternal recurrence, when suddenly she said ‘Close your eyes. I want to give
you something special.’ Naively, I complied, thinking she had a gift to give me. The next thing I
knew I was on the receiving end of a more-than-friendly kiss. Instinctively, I drew back in
surprise, exclaiming ‘what was that about?’ Sally was taken aback by my reaction. Catching her
breath, she looked at me sheepishly and inquired, ‘You do love me, don’t you?’ Immediately I
suspected the presence of a perspectival misunderstanding, stemming in all likelihood from a
difference in our personality types. Sally was a moderately attractive young lady; but I was
certainly not in love with her, nor did I wish her to harbour such feelings for me.
Instead of responding to this situation in one of two (perhaps typical) extreme ways—
either expelling Sally from my office and asking her not to return until she had come to terms
with her inappropriate feelings, or taking advantage of the opportunity to engage in a clandestine
affair—I suggested we meet on a subsequent day to discuss what had happened. The result was a
series of philopsychic counseling sessions that went something like this. After listening to Sally
interpret some of my past actions as evidence of a deep affection for her, I became convinced that
this was indeed a problem relating to personality types. So I took out the map of Jungian types
that I had used in the previous semester’s class (see Figure 9) and suggested we reflect on our
types in an effort to understand why this misunderstanding had arisen. She, it turns out, regarded
herself as a feeling type, with a secondary emphasis on sensation, while I (at that time) regarded
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myself as a thinking type, with intuition as secondary. In discussing the implications of this
difference—to make a long story short—I came to realize how words and actions I had regarded
as innocent had been genuinely misleading; and Sally came to realize how she had imposed her
own assumptions onto my behavior, assuming that anyone who acted as I did must be thinking
and feeling the same things she would be thinking and feeling, if she were to behave in such
ways. This may not have been much consolation in helping Sally recover from the heartache of
unrequited love; but it did avert the highly undesirable alternative outcomes of her potential
suicide or my potential loss of a job and/or a marriage, should the situation not have been treated
in this philopsychic way. I’m pleased to say that Sally and I maintained a healthy friendship for
some time after her graduation and are still on good terms to this day.
Similar examples would be easy to construct for anyone familiar with Jung’s system of
psychological types. Other perspectival transformations that could arise in a counseling situation
would be the insight that an introverted approach to a given situation needs to be extraverted, that
one’s intuition was being trusted too much and needed to be supplemented more often by the
concrete realities available through sensation, etc. The key to all such insights is that the
counselor presents the Jungian system to the counselee as a map that empowers the person to
make his or her own decisions as to how to proceed, on the basis of any changes in perspective
that need to be made. The counselor’s role is in the first place to listen to the problem and
identify which philopsychic map is likely to be most helpful, secondly to introduce the map to the
counselee as clearly and simply as possible, thirdly to ask questions that will encourage the
counselee to reflect more deeply on the situation at hand, and finally to provide feedback as the
counselee grapples with the implications of various perspectival shifts. Let us now look at some
less obvious illustrations of how Kant’s Table of Judgments can be used in a very similar way.
Scenario II. Benjamin, a slightly older-than-average student in my Introduction to
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Philosophy class, came to me distraught. His mother had just kicked his father out of the house.
The humiliation of having a father who was being forced to live on the street was too much to
bear. After some initial discussion, it became apparent that Benjamin was blaming God for this
whole mess and that this was being used as a subtle way of avoiding any sense of responsibility. I
therefore reminded him of the theory we had discussed in class several weeks earlier, regarding
Kant’s theory that all human judgments have four formal aspects. Showing him the map (i.e.,
Figure 7), I asked Benjamin to select two categories that seemed most closely related to his
recent emotional disturbance.
First Benjamin selected quantity. After being asked to elaborate, he explained that the
amount of time available for he and his father to be together would now be drastically reduced.
Since this fact was beyond his control, I asked him to set that thought aside for the moment and
reflect on the category opposite to quantity, i.e. quality. ‘Does the word “quality” bring to mind
any possible solution to your problem?’, I asked. We then commiserated for some time about
how western culture has reduced the quality of life to a point far inferior to what it once was,
enticing us to measure value almost exclusively in quantitative terms. The turning point in our
conversation came when Benjamin suddenly realized that a few minutes of high quality time with
his father each week might be more meaningful than many hours spent in non-communicative
cohabitation. Benjamin had begun to change his perspective with respect to the problem he was
facing.
Hoping to encourage a still deeper transformation, I asked Benjamin to select another
category from the map. Out of the remaining two, he chose relation as the source of his anxiety.
Unsure of his reasons, I asked him to explain his choice in terms of one of the three subordinate
categories of relation. He replied that he had always thought of the relation between he and his
father as categorical (‘Be my father!’), but now it seemed to be disjunctive (‘You are my father,
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but you live away from home.’). Again, this is not something Benjamin was in a position to
change. So I suggested that maybe he could change the modality of his interpretation of this
whole situation (i.e., his relation to his own way of thinking about it). Our subsequent discussion
revealed that he had been approaching the whole problem in a fatalistic mood that assumed what
Kant might call ‘apodeictic’ modality (i.e., absolute necessity). In a flash of insight the student
came to realize that he did have the power to change his perspective and view the whole situation
in terms of ‘problematic’ modality (i.e., as a problem with a wide variety of possible solutions).
The next time I met with Benjamin, he told me the situation with his father had not improved
much, but that he had stopped blaming God and was beginning to implement several plans
designed to improve the quality of all the relationships involved.
Scenario III. John’s problem was very different from Benjamin’s. He had written a short
essay for my Self-Discovery of Man class, and had dropped by to find out why he had received
such a low grade. In the course of our discussion, he revealed that he was currently in the middle
of a crisis with his girlfriend, and that this was partly responsible for his poor performance. Less
concerned now about his grade, John asked for advice about whether or not he should break up
with this girl, who was apparently very selfish and easily angered by anything that did not go her
way. Of course, I refused to make his decision for him. Instead, I brought out the map of Kant’s
Table of Judgments and asked him to select two categories that seemed most responsible for the
trouble he was having in making this decision.
After I explained the nature of each category to John in some detail, he chose modality,
on the grounds that he was in a ‘problematic’ situation, a situation with too many potential
outcomes. I thus asked him to look at the opposite category, relation, in hopes of finding an
alternative way of interpreting his situation. No sooner had I drawn his attention to the three
subordinate categories of relation, than he exclaimed, ‘I must love her!—it’s categorical!’ But
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that, as soon became clear in our subsequent discussion, was the root of the problem. He had
unconditionally committed himself to love a person who was proving to be very different from
the person he thought he knew, when they first fell in love.
I then asked John, as usual, to choose one of the remaining two categories in hopes of
gaining further insight. This time, after a more lengthy deliberation, he selected quality,
explaining that his relationship seems to have a more and more ‘negative’ quality, the longer it
progresses. ‘The more I try to encourage positive interaction’, he lamented, ‘the more negative
the outcome seems to be.’ Eventually, however, we focused on how his attitude to the quantity of
love relationships could provide a way out. He realized that this relationship was ‘singular’, in
the sense that it was but one instantiation of a principle with universal validity (i.e., to love
others). In the end, this insight led him to make the difficult decision to break up for a two-week
‘trial period’—which ended up being permanent.
Scenario IV. Alice was an openly religious person who was being plagued by doubts,
largely as a result of attending my Hermeneutics class. Fearing she would reach a ‘point of no
return’ if she gave up too many of her childhood religious beliefs, she came to my office one day.
Her original intent, I think, was to confront what she perceived to be heretical tendencies in my
teaching; but her objections soon turned into an expression of her own insecurity. I suggested we
think together about the proper role of religious beliefs by examining how they fit into Kant’s
Table of Judgments. She agreed.
Interestingly, Alice deviated from the norm by insisting on expressing her problem in
terms of the two dynamical categories, relation and modality, instead of one mathematical and
one dynamical category. She expressed anxiety over the fact that her beliefs had once been very
‘categorical’ (i.e., black and white), but were now becoming more and more ‘hypothetical’ (i.e.,
dependent on various qualifications). Likewise, she had once felt confident to be ‘assertoric’
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about her beliefs (i.e., to assert them as definite, actual truths), but was now seeing them as much
more ‘problematic’. These changes disturbed her, because she felt they represented a weakening
of her religious commitment.
This situation called for two responses. First, I encouraged Alice to look to the synthetic
category in both cases, in hopes of finding a way forward: a ‘disjunctive’ approach to belief
might provide her with a smaller but more reliable set of core truths that could be held with
‘apodeictic’ certainty. But more importantly, I encouraged her to consider whether her decision
to ignore the categories of quantity and quality might be symptomatic of an overly intellectual
approach. I challenged her to experience the God about whom she had constructed these various
beliefs. Her response to these suggestions would need to be explained in considerable detail in
order to be fully appreciated; instead, let it suffice to say that these reflections empowered Alice
to face her religious crisis with a new awareness of what was (and was not) really at stake.
In conclusion I would like to emphasize that the main point of this essay has been to
illustrate how philosophical and psychological maps can be used as tools for stimulating
perspectival shifts in our thinking about any given problem. I am myself only at the very early
stages of investigating how Kant’s categorial scheme, with its logical structure so similar (if not
identical) to that of Jung’s psychological types, can best be used in this way for counseling. I do
not claim to have proven anything, but merely hope to have encouraged those scholarly-minded
readers with a ‘philopsychic’ bent to join me in exploring such possibilities. The points to keep
in mind are that most personal (as well as philosophical) problems require a change of
perspective in order to be solved, that philosophical practitioners are especially well-equipped to
see things from a variety of perspectives, that actually constructing visible (geometrical) maps is
a good way to facilitate such changes, and (perhaps most importantly) that in philosophical
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counseling situations we must be careful to allow the counselee to make the key decisions,
without letting our scholarly acumen push through the solution we may think is best.
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